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COMMENTS
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams:
Insufficient Notice Under the New York
In Rem Statutes
INTRODUCTION
T HE United States Constitution declares that no person shall
be deprived of property without due process of law.' Al-
though the Supreme Court has given no precise definition as to
what constitutes due process, one of its fundamental elements is
reasonable notice of the opportunity to appear and be heard.
2
Real property tax sales are a frequently used method of col-
lecting delinquent property taxes. Most tax sale statutes rely upon
constructive notice 3 by publication and/or posting as an adequate
substitute for personal service upon parties affected by the sale.
4
As a consequence, tax sales often extinguish property rights with-
out ever having actually notified the interested parties. For this
reason, tax sales have repeatedly presented the courts with the
question of whether constructive notice is adequate notice under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 When de-
A note of thanks to Matthew X. Wagner, Jr., Esq., and Mr. Owen Mangan of the Title
Guarantee Company for their assistance.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
3. When used in this Comment, constructive notice shall mean notice by publication
and posting. Constructive notice can be distinguished from actual notice in that construc-
tive notice "is imputed by . . . law by reason of the notorious nature of the thing to be
noticed .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (5th ed. 1979).
4. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 1002(1), 1124(1) (McKinney 1972). Every state
has adopted some type of tax sale procedure. For a list of the relevant statutes in each
state, see Note, The Constitutionality of Notice by Publication in Tax Sale Proceedings, 84 YALE
L.J. 1505 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tax Sale Proceedings].
5. See Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414 (1908); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241
(1907); Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904) (landowners are not entitled to actual notice of
a tax sale). But see Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (notice of tax sale mailed
389
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ciding the issue, courts usually turn to the landmark decision of
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,' which held that no-
tice should be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to notify interested parties of a pending action which will be ac-
corded finality.7 In fashioning such a general rule, the Supreme
Court left the states with room for discretion depending upon the
circumstances of each case. This discretion, however, resulted in a
division among state courts as to whether constructive notice of
tax sales was adequate."
Thirty-three years after Mullane, the Supreme Court has
finally resolved the conflict. In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Ad-
ams,9 the Court struck down Indiana's tax sale statute which pro-
vided for notice by publication alone.10 The Court held that when
a mortgagee's interest in property is publicly recorded, construc-
tive notice of a pending tax sale is inadequate notice under the
due process clause. Constructive notice must be supplemented by
actual notice mailed to the mortgagee or by personal service, a
The Mennonite ruling has far-reaching implications for the proce-
dures used to collect delinquent property taxes across the nation.
In order to conform to the ruling, many states will have to amend
their statutes.
Although Mennonite Las resolved the issue of whether Mullane
applies to tax sales, the new ruling has left two very important
questions unanswered. First, the Mennonite Court did not address
itself to a common type of notice provision. In New York, for ex-
ample, a mortgagee will receive mailed notice of an in rem tax
to a known incompetent violates due process). See also Note, Due Process in Tax Sales in New
York. The Insufficiency of Notice by Publication, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 769 (1974) (New York
court held that Mullane did not require actual notice of tax sale) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Due Process in New York]; Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Notice by Publication Is Con-
stitutionally Inadequate In a Tax Sale Proceeding, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1463 (1978) (Michigan
court held that Mullane required actual notice of tax sale) [hereinafter Wayne Note].
6. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Mullane held that in the settlement of a common trust fund,
notice by publication to known beneficiaries who would surely not see the publications vio-
lated due process. Notice by publication was held sufficient only to those beneficiaries
whose names and addresses were unknown or not ascertainable by the trustee. Id. at 313-
18.
7. Id. at 314.
8. See infra note 33.
9. 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
10. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1.1-24-1 to 6-1.1-25-19 (Burns 1984).
11. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
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foreclosure if he registers his name, address and a description of
the mortgaged property with the enforcing officer.12 The state of
Indiana had no similar provision at the time of the sale in Mennon-
ite although it did adopt one prior to argument before the Su-
preme Court.'3 Since the amendment was made subsequent to the
sale in issue, the Court reserved decision as to its constitutional-
ity.14 Therefore, the fate of New York's notice provision remains
in question. More importantly, the validity of thousands of tax ti-
tles which continue to be sold pursuant to the New York in rem
statutes are particularly vulnerable titles.15
Mennonite left a second question unanswered. It is unclear
whether the scope of the decision should be limited to mortgagees
or whether lienholders, judgment creditors, tenants and other in-
terests will benefit as well.
Both unanswered questions leave state courts free to interpret
Mennonite, much as was done with Mullane. Sympathetic to the ad-
ministrative problems Mennonite poses, state courts may narrowly
limit its application. This Comment maintains that New York
courts should refrain from narrowly construing the Mennonite rul-
ing. This Comment will examine the constitutionality of the New
York in rem tax foreclosure procedure in light of the Mennonite
teaching. It will first discuss the historical justifications for con-
structive notice of tax sales.' 6 An analysis of the uncertainty which
followed Mullane will ensue.17 Finally, the Mennonite rationale will
then be examined and applied to the New York in rem proce-
12. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1126 (McKinney 1972).
13. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-4.2 (Burns 1984).
14. "The constitutionality of [such a provision] is not before us." Mennonite, 103 S. Ct.
at 2708 n.2.
15. Tax titles are often said to be suspect because they are frequently challenged by
aggrieved owners and mortgagees. In light of the threat of subsequent challenge, one au-
thor has classified tax titles as nothing more than a "cloud upon the title." L. SCHWARTZ,
REAL ESTATE MANUAL 400 (1937). Cf Pedowitz, Tax Titles-Would You Insure One?, 49 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 550 (1977) (tax sale deeds are often unmarketable and uninsurable investments).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 19-27.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 28-50. One author predicted that the Supreme
Court would have to resolve the issue, although that author concluded the Court's current
composition would yield a decision contrary to that reached in Mennonite. See Pedowitz,
supra note 15, at 553. Others have argued in favor of requiring mailed notice to interested
parties. See, e.g., Note, Due Process in New York, supra note 5, at 778; Note, Tax Sale Proceed-




dure.' s Two conclusions will be drawn. First, the New York in
rem notice provision, although distinguishable from Mennonite, is
unconstitutional. New York courts should not uphold the in rem
statute merely because it is distinguishable. Second, the Mennonite
holding should not be limited to publicly recorded mortgage in-
terests. That decision's rationale and recent applications of the
Mennonite rationale indicate that all publicly recorded interests
should benefit from the ruling. Therefore, New York courts
should also interpret the new ruling to require actual and uncon-
ditional notice of an in rem foreclosure to all publicly recorded
interests.
I. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF TAX SALES
A. Justifications for Constructive Notice
Several early twentieth-century Supreme Court rulings held
that notice by publication of a pending tax sale did not violate due
process.19 These decisions offered four justifications for construc-
tive notice rather than personal service upon the parties affected
by the sale.
First, under the territorial concepts of jurisdiction which pre-
vailed prior to 1945,20 personal service upon nonresident land-
owners was not possible. Nonresidents were therefore presumed
to have a "caretaker" within the state who watched over the land
and took necessary action when the land fell into delinquency.2'
Under this argument, constructive notice was necessitated by the
18. See infra text accompanying notes 85-97.
19. Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414 (1908); Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904);
Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 (1907); Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890).
20. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). "The authority of every tribunal is nec-
essarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established." Id. at 720.
The Pennoyer doctrine has been rendered obsolete by the "minimum contacts" theory of
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
21. In Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Corp., 130 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1889),
the Court stated:
The [nonresident] owner of real estate. . . cannot evade the duties and obliga-
tions which the law imposes upon him . . . [i]t is, therefore, the duty of the
owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take measures that in some way
he shall be represented when his property is called into requisition.
See also Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 254-55 (1907). For a discussion of the historical




nonresident status of the owner.
Second, all landowners, nonresident and resident alike, were
under a duty to remain informed as to the status of their lands.
This duty arose because owners were under an obligation to pay
the annual property tax and were also presumed to know the con-
sequences of nonpayment. The presumption, coupled with the an-
nual obligation, placed a duty of inquiry upon the landowner; a
duty which absolved the state of personal service requirements.22
A third justification for constructive notice was that real
property tax sales were of that unique breed of legal proceeding
known as an action in rem.23 An in rem action, as opposed to an
in personam action, carried less stringent notice requirements be-
cause it was "the land itself" that was in issue. Since it was the
land that was in issue, the affected parties were not required to be
present. 4
The fourth justification, one frequently given today, is that
the state has a vital interest in collecting its revenues quickly and
inexpensively. To impose costly notice requirements would inhibit
the timely flow of revenue. Under these circumstances, construc-
tive notice is viewed as a reasonable balance of the relative
interests.25
22. In Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414, 418 (1904), the Court stated:
The owner of property whose taxes . . . have remained unpaid for more than
one year must be held to the knowledge that proceedings for sale are liable to
be begun as soon as practicable. . . . If he exercises due vigilance, he cannot
fail to learn of their pendency, .... [t]his satisfies the demands of due process
of law.
See also North Loramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925); Leigh v. Green,
193 U.S. 79 (1904); The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 144 (1815).
For a discussion of the historical significance of the Longyear and Leigh decisions, ex-
tending nonresident caretaker reasoning to resident duty reasoning, see Wayne Note, supra
note 5, at 1469-70.
23. An action in rem is defined as a "proceeding that takes no cognizance of the own-
er but determines right in specific property against all the world, equally binding on every-
one." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 713 (5th ed. 1979).
24. "It is from the lands alone, and not from their owner, that the taxes are to be
satisfied, and each acre bears its part." Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. at 258. See also Fraser,
Actions In Rem, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 29 (1948) (distinguishing between in rem and in personam
actions); Note, Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1257 (1957)
(historical development of the in rem jurisdiction over real property).
25. In Leigh, the Court said that "[i]n authorizing the proceedings to enforce the pay-
ment of the taxes upon lands sold to a purchaser at a tax sale, the State is in exercise of its




The four mentioned justifications have historically been said
to outweigh the owner's interest in actual notice of a pending sale.
Undoubtedly, constructive notice does further the inexpensive
collection of delinquent taxes. It eliminates the need for title
searches, service of complaints, mailing and other administrative
expenses. However, it does so at the expense of the individual.
Notwithstanding the government's need to collect its revenue,
many have criticized constructive notice because of its inequitable
and harsh results. In addition, these results could be avoided if
actual notice is given. 6 Much of the scholarly condemnation of
constructive notice stemmed from the Supreme Court's ruling in
Mullane,2 7 the seminal ruling on the adequacy of constructive
notice.
B. Mullane and Progeny
Mullane involved the settlement and account of a common
trust fund under the New York Banking Law. In that decision,
the Supreme Court held that notice by publication of a pending
settlement to those beneficiaries whose names and addresses ap-
peared on the trustee's records was insufficient notice under the
due process clause. Where the names and addresses were known
or reasonably ascertainable, the trustee would be required to pro-
vide notice by mail or other certain means. Balancing the interests
of the state and the individual, the Court stated the general rule
of Mullane:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceed-
ing which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
Many state courts have invoked this principle in support of the argument for construc-
tive notice. See, e.g., City of Newark v. Yeskel, 5 N.J. 313, 74 A.2d 883 (1950); Knapp v.
Josephine County, 192 Or. 327, 235 P.2d 564 (1951); Chesney v. Gresham, 64 Cal. App.
3d 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. 238, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1976).
In fact, many commentators continue to make the argument as a present solution to
urban blight. See, e.g., Langsdort, Urban Decay, Property Tax Delinquency: A Solution in St.
Louis, 5 URB. L. 729 (1973); Note, Tax Sale Law in New Jersey: A Re-Examination, 26 RUTGERS
L. REv. 266, 278-79 (1973).
26. See, e.g., Note, Due Process in New York, supra note 5, at 786 (suggesting danger of
property loss by mere inadvertence); Note, Tax Sale Proceedings, supra note 4, at 1505 (own-
er could lose property without ever knowing what was happening); Note, Due Process of Law
and Notice by Publication, 32 IND. L.J. 469, 485 (1957) (notice must be conveyed through
means most likely to give actual notice).
27. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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to afford them an opportunity to present their objection.2
The Mullane Court addressed the same arguments used to justify
constructive notice of tax sales. In Mullane, the Court rejected dis-
tinctions between in rem and in personam actions as a legitimate
justification for constructive notice. Such distinctions, the Court
held, were "ancient in origin, .... elusive," and generally
confusing.29
The Mullane Court, however, did reaffirm that owners were
under a duty to remain informed as to the status of their holdings.
The Court noted that:
A state may indulge in the [reasonable] assumption that one who has left
tangible property in the state either has abandoned it, in which case pro-
ceedings against it deprive him of nothing, or that he has left some caretaker
under a duty to let him know that it is being jeopardized .... "It is the part
of common prudence for all those who have any interest in [a thing], to
guard that interest. .. .
In addition to reaffirming the duty argument, the Mullane
Court also recognized that the "practical difficulties and costs" of
finding "great numbers of beneficiaries" might justify the use of
constructive notice.31 In effect, the Court refused to commit "it-
self to any formula" in determining when actual notice was due; it
would vary "with the circumstances and conditions" of each
case.
3 2
It was not long before the states divided over whether Mul-
lane required actual notice of a pending tax sale.33 Those courts
28. Id. at 314 (emphasis supplied).
29. "[W]e think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are so elusive and
confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary
from state to state." Id. at 312.
30. Id. at 316 (quoting The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 144 (1815)).
31. Id. at 317.
32. Id. at 314. Whether a particular method of notice was reasonable would depend
upon the balance between the state's interests and the interests of the individual. Id.
33. The states of Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, and New Jersey held
that notice by publication was insufficient in the context of tax sales. See, Laz v. Southwest-
ern Land Co., 97 Ariz. 69, 397 P.2d 52 (1964); Quay Dev., Inc. v. Elegante Bldg. Corp.,
392 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1981); Chapin v. Aylward, 204 Kan. 448, 464 P.2d 177 (1970); Dow
v. State, 396 Mich. 192, 240 N.W.2d 450 (1976); Collector of Revenue v. Parcels of Land
Encumbered with Delinquent Tax Liens, 585 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1979); Montville v. Block
69, Lot 10, 74 N.J. 1, 376 A.2d 909 (1977).
The jurisdictions of California, Oklahoma, Oregon, New York, and Virginia, on the
other hand, upheld notice by publication in the context of tax foreclosure sales. See Ches-
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which approved constructive notice distinguished Mullane as not
being applicable to the field of real property tax foreclosures, and
offered the two justifications that Mullane had reaffirmed-the
taxpayer's duty3 4 and economic practicality 35 justifications.
Although the conflicting interpretations were due in part to
the general language in the Mullane decision, they were also due
to the Supreme Court's indefinite handling of the issue on later
occasions. In a number of cases, the Court seemed to intentionally
avoid the issue. For example, in Pearson v. Dodd,38 the appellant
mineral interest owner contested the adequacy of constructive no-
tice under the West Virginia tax sale procedure. Under that pro-
cedure, a tax lien was first sold to a purchaser who then waited for
an eighteen-month redemption period to lapse. The purchaser
then applied for a tax deed. When the case was ultimately argued
before the Supreme Court, the appellant inexplicably conceded
the constitutionality of the notice of sale and only contested the
validity of the transfer of the deed. The Court held that the state
had acquired absolute title by virtue of the lapsed eighteen-month
redemption period and dismissed the appeal because the appellant
had no "constitutionally protected property . . . interest" upon
which to challenge the notice provision of the first sale. It is not
unreasonable to interpret the Court's holding as a dismissal on the
merits.3 8
ney v. Gresham, 64 Cal. App. 3d 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. 238, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1976);
Christie-Stewart, Inc. v. Paschall, 502 P.2d 1265 (Okla. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414
U.S. 100 (1973), affd upon remand, 544 P.2d 505 (Okla. 1974), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976); Umatella County v. Porter, 12 Or. App. 393, 507 P.2d 406 (1973); Botens v.
Aronauer, 32 N.Y.2d 243, 298 N.E.2d 73, 344 N.Y.S.2d 892, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S.
1059 (1973); Pearson v. Dodd, 221 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S.
396 (1977).
34. E.g., in Botens, the New York Court of Appeals held that Mullane did not require
anything more than constructive notice of tax sales because the beneficiaries in Mullane
"had no reason to expect that their property interests were being affected . . ." while in
the case of tax sales, the regular levy of taxes put the owner on notice of his duty to pay
the tax. Botens, 32 N.Y.2d at 247, 298 N.E.2d at 75, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
35. The Supreme Court of New Jersey originally held Mullane inapplicable to tax sales
because "the speedy collection of taxes, unfraught with procedural complications, is indis-
pensible for the support of government .... " City of Newark v. Yeskel, 5 N.J. 313, 318-
19, 74 A.2d 883, 885 (1950). Yeskel was subsequently overruled in Montville v. Block 69,
Lot 10, 74 N.J. 1, 376 A.2d 909 (1977).
36. 429 U.S. 396 (1977).
37. Id. at 398.
38. See also Christie-Stewart, Inc. v. Paschall, 502 P.2d 1265 (Okla. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 100 (1973), affd upon remand, 544 P.2d 505 (Okla. 1974), cert. denied,
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In the New York tax sale case of Botens v. Aronauer,39 the New
York Court of Appeals explicitly upheld a New York provision
which provided for notice to the owner by publication alone. On
appeal to the Supreme Court it appeared that the properly
presented question would finally place the issue squarely before
the Court. The Court, however, dismissed the appeal for want of
a substantial question. A number of state courts have readily in-
terpreted this dismissal as the Supreme Court's approval of con-
structive notice.40 On the other hand, it has also been argued that
an examination of the Botens record reveals that the owner had in
fact received mailed notice and- that this fact rendered the case a
poor one for deciding the constitutionality of constructive
notice.41
In addition to the dismissals, the Supreme Court has on occa-
sion reaffirmed the argument that owners are obliged to remain
informed as to the status of their property. As recently as 1982, in
Texaco, Inc. v. Short,42 the Court considered an Indiana statute
which automatically terminated unused mineral interest rights.
The Court held that the automatic termination, although done
without notice, did not violate due process because the mineral
interest owners were under a duty to know the terms of the stat-
utes. The Court stated:
All persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes and
must take note of the procedure adopted by them; and when that procedure
is not unreasonable or arbitrary there are no constitutional limitations re-
lieving them from conforming to it. This is especially the case with respect to
those statutes relating to the taxation or condemnation of land.4
426 U.S. 935 (1976). In the Christie case, the Supreme Court also dismissed the appeal
where it appeared that the statute of limitations had extinguished the appellant's property
rights. Justices Douglas and Stevens dissented-they would have decided the constitutional
issue since that was the only issue addressed in the jurisdictional statements. 414 U.S. at
102-04.
39. 32 N.Y.2d 243, 298 N.E.2d 73, 344 N.Y.S.2d 892, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1059
(1973).
40. E.g., Grant County v. Guyer, 296 Or. 14, 672 P.2d 707 (1983); Guaranty Mort-
gage Corp. v. Town of Burlington, 385 Mass. 411, 432 N.E.2d 480 (1982).
41. Apparently the enforcing officer made it a practice to send notices even though
not required by the statute. See Note, Tax Sale Proceedings, supra note 4, at 1550.
42. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
43. Id. at 532 n.25 (quoting North Loramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276
(1925)) (emphasis supplied). The Short Court distinguished Mullane on the ground that
mineral interest owners are sophisticated businessmen charged with knowledge of the auto-
matic operation of the statutes which granted their interests as a matter of legislative grace.
3971984]
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In other cases,4 however, the Court gave some indication
that Mullane in fact was applicable to proceedings involving the
taxation or condemnation of land. In Walker v. City of Hutchinson,4
the Court invalidated a Kansas condemnation proceeding wherein
notice had been published because "[iut is common knowledge
that mere newspaper publication rarely informs a landowner of
proceedings against his property. ' 46 The Walker Court concluded
that the notice therein was inadequate, under the circumstances,
because the owner's name and address were ascertainable from
the public deed records.4
In Schroeder v. City of New Yorks the plaintiff sought to enjoin
the City of New York from diverting a stream pursuant to a con-
demnation of his land. The plaintiff argued that publication and
posting on nearby lands was insufficient notice under the rule of
Mullane. The Court agreed. Since the owner's name and address
were reasonably ascertainable, notice by publication was held in-
sufficient. Restating the rule of Mullane, the Court said: "The
general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by
publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name
and address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose le-
44. It might even be argued that the Supreme Court did in fact apply Mullane to tax
sales. In Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956), the Court held that mailed notice
of a New York tax sale to a known incompetent was a due process violation under the
Mullane test. The Covey holding, however, has been narrowly applied and limited to its
facts. Further, the incompetent in Covey did receive mailed notice of the sale, hence notice
by publication was not in issue. See generally Note, Real Property-In Rem Tax Foreclosure
Against Incompetent's Property-Due Process Violation, 23 BROOKLYN L. REv. 145 (1956); Note,
In Rem Tax Foreclosure-Notice, 6 BUFFALO L. REv. 345 (1956).
In Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103 (1956), the Supreme Court held that an in
rem foreclosure pursuant to the New York City Administrative Code did not violate due
process. In Nelson, the owner's bookkeeper failed to inform the owner of the notice she
had received. The appellant argued that under Covey the city should have known from its
records that the mailed notice had been ineffective because the appellant had recently paid
other larger water and assessment bills. The Court disagreed and held that the city could
not be held to a duty to determine why a taxpayer might pay some taxes and neglect
others. The Court noted that there was a significant difference between known facts and
imputed knowledge. Id. at 108. Although the Nelson and Covey decisions are interesting
applications of Mullane to tax sales, neither decision addressed the issue of constructive
notice by publication and both are, therefore, of no precedential value in constructive no-
tice cases.
45. 352 U.S. 112 (1962).
46. Id. at 116.
47. Id.
48. 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
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gally protected interests are directly affected by the proceedings
in question."4
The condemnation cases and the tax dismissal cases left the
state courts in disarray. Although Mullane sought to articulate a
general rule of guidance, it resulted in conflict and confusion re-
garding tax sales. Even the justices of the Supreme Court dis-
agreed over what Mullane required, as is evidenced by Justice
O'Connor's spirited dissent in the Mennonite decision. It is with
this background that we now turn to the Mennonite case, keeping
in mind that "[w]here the names and post-office addresses of those
affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for
resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its
pendency." 50
II. THE Mennonite HOLDING
The Mennonite Board of Missions (MBM) held a $14,000
purchase money mortgage on a parcel of property in Elkhart, In-
diana, which it had sold to Alfred J. Moore. Under the mortgage
terms, Moore was responsible for paying the property taxes. Un-
beknownst to MBM, Moore failed to pay the taxes and in 1977
Elkhart County initiated proceedings for nonpayment of taxes.5 '
The county complied with the several statutes requiring mailed
notice to the owner Moore, 52 newspaper publication, and court-
house posting of the notice of tax sale.53 The property was then
sold to Richard Adams for $1,167.57. 54 At the close of a two-year
redemption period, the county sent Moore an additional notice
stating that title would soon pass to Adams if the taxes were not
49. Id. at 212-13.
50. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318. See also Note, Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings,
supra note 24, at 1263-64; Note, Due Process of Law and Notice by Publication, supra note 17,
at 470.
51. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-1 et seq. (Burns 1984). Under the Indiana procedure,
the county sold the tax lien to a tax-lien-sale purchaser who would in turn wait until a two-
year redemption period lapsed at which time the purchaser would apply for a tax deed. Id.
§§ 6-1.1-24-9, 6-1.1-25-4.
52. "[Tlhe County auditor shall send a notice of the sale by certified mail to the owner
or owners of the real property at their last known address." Id. § 6-1.1-24-4.
53. "The County auditor shall post a copy of the notice ... at a public place of post-
ing in the county courthouse at least three (3) weeks before the date of sale." Id. § 6-1.1-
24-3.
54. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. at 2709.
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paid.5 5 Moore ignored this notice also. Meanwhile, Moore contin-
ued to make the mortgage payments to MBM which still had no
knowledge of the sale or pending title transfer.
Upon expiration of the redemption period, the county issued
a tax deed to Adams vesting all title in him free and clear of all
liens or encumbrances, including MBM's $8,327.19 mortgage in-
terest.5 Adams then sought to quiet title against Moore and
MBM. Moore defaulted. MBM, on the other hand, contested the
constitutionality of the notice of sale and redemption right which
it had received by publication alone.57 Both the Indiana trial court
and Court of Appeals upheld the tax sale statutes against the con-
stitutional challenge.58 The Supreme Court, after noting probable
jurisdiction, 59 reversed the Indiana courts and ruled that the no-
tice given to MBM did not meet due process standards under the
fourteenth amendment. The majority held that where a mortga-
gee's interest is publicly recorded, constructive notice by publica-
tion is insufficient and must be supplemented by notice mailed to
the mortgagee's last known address or by personal service.60
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall cited Mullane as the
controlling authority on whether notice by publication is ade-
quate. The Mennonite Court, as did the Mullane Court, pointed
out that notice by publication is a far less reliable method of no-
tice than the "inexpensive and efficient" mail system.6" Indeed,
the Court stated that notice by publication is "designed primarily
to attract prospective purchasers to the tax sale" rather than to
notify the affected parties of their right to appear and be heard. 62
The Court also believed that a mortgagee's name and address is
55. The additional notice is required under Indiana law. See IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-
25-6 (Burns 1984).
56. Id. § 6-1.1-25-4(d).
57. The case presented two issues. The first was whether the notice of sale was ade-
quate. The second issue was whether the redemption notice was adequate. By deciding the
first issue the second issue was rendered moot. Mennonite, 103 S.Ct. at 2712 n,6.
58. Mennonite Bd. of Missions, Inc. v. Adams, 427 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. 1981).
59. Mennonite Bd. of Missions, Inc. v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 204 (1982).
60. Mennonite Bd. of Missions, Inc. v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2711 (1983).
61. Id. (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982) (posting summons on
door of apartment inadequate means of providing notice of forcible entry and detainer
where it was commonly known that the notices were frequently torn down by mischievous
children)).
62. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. at 2711.
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easily ascertained from the public records.6 3 Under these circum-
stances, the Court concluded that the constructive notice given to
MBM was constitutionally inadequate since it was not a means
"desirous of actually informing" the mortgagee.64
The Court then addressed all of the traditional justifications
for constructive notice of tax sales, including those which distin-
guished Mullane.65  The Mennonite Court rejected all the
justifications.
Regarding the distinction between an in rem and in personam
action, the Court stated:
[A]n adverse judgment in rem directly affects the property owner by divest-
ing him of his rights in the property before the Court. In rejecting the tradi-
tional justification for distinguishing between in rem and in personam actions, the
Court has not left all interested claimants to the vagaries of indirect notice.6
The Court also dismissed the argument that owners and
mortgagees are under a duty to remain informed as to the status
of the land in which they hold an interest. The Court said that "a
party's ability to take steps to safeguard its interests does not re-
lieve the State of its constitutional obligation" to give mailed no-
tice. 7 This holding clearly goes beyond Mullane, which perceived
the state's obligation as dependent upon the party's ability and
duty to protect its interests.
Third, and related to the Court's rejection of the duty argu-
ment, the majority dismissed the caretaker argument as an unreal-
istic justification. The purchaser, Adams, had argued that notice
to Moore, the owner, was the equivalent of notice to MBM.68 This
argument restated the traditional "caretaker" theory. The Court,
however, noted that notice to an owner who has himself "failed to
take steps necessary to preserve his own property interests . ..
cannot be expected to lead to actual notice to the mortgagee."6 9
Finally, the majority also dismissed the economic argument
that the state must have an inexpensive means of collecting its rev-
63. Id. The mortgage on file in the county records identified the Mennonite Board of
Missions by name only. No address was listed. The Court assumed that the address would
be reasonably ascertainable from some other source. Id. at 2711 n.4.
64. Id. at 2711 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
65. See supra notes 34-35, and accompanying text.
66. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. at 2710 n.3 (emphasis supplied).
67. Id. at 2711.
68. Brief for Appellee at 12, Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
69. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
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enue. The Court stated that although requiring mailed notice
might result in an additional administrative burden, it may "ulti-
mately relieve the county of a more substantial administrative bur-
den if the mortgagee arranges for payment of the delinquent
taxes prior to the tax sale.
' 70
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
dissented because she believed the Court's interpretation of Mul-
lane was "unwarranted both as a general rule and as a rule in this
case."71 The dissent believed that "the key focus is the 'reasona-
bleness' of the means chosen by the State. Whether a particular
method of notice is reasonable depends upon the outcome of bal-
ancing the 'interest of the State' and 'the interest sought to be
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.' "72 This balance, Jus-
tice O'Connor said, should be determined by the states under all
the circumstances and would be upset only if irrationally done. 3
Justice O'Connor then reiterated two of the traditional justifi-
cations in support of constructive notice.Y She said that "[w]hen a
party is unreasonable in failing to protect its interest despite its
ability to do so, due process does not require that the State save
the party from its own lack of care. '7 5 This clearly restated the
"duty" argument which had for so many years distinguished real
property tax sales from the Mullane case. Justice O'Connor also
believed that the state has a strong "interest in avoiding the bur-
den imposed by the requirement that it . . . check the records
and ascertain with respect to each delinquent taxpayer whether
there is a mortgagee, perhaps whether the mortgage has been
paid off, and whether there is a dependable address. ' 7 6 Thus, ac-
cording to the dissent, the state's interest in quick and inexpensive
70. Id. at 2712 n.5. Actual notice may indeed be the most effective means of effecting
payment of delinquent taxes. The County of Erie, New York, collects approximately
$3,000,000 per year in delinquent taxes. Most of this amount is collected after owners are
given mailed notice of a pending sale but prior to the actual sale. These figures suggest
that the mere notice of sale is an effective threat which collects the revenue. Ciotta, Ruling
Likely to Hurt County in Auction Costs, Buffalo News, Aug. 7, 1983, at Cl, col. 4. But see infra
note 81.
71. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
72. Id. at 2713.
73. Id.
74. Justice O'Connor did not state the "caretaker" or outdated territorial jurisdiction
arguments for constructive notice. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
75. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. at 2717.
76. Id. at 2715.
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revenue collection remained a legitimate justification for construc-
tive notice.
In effect, the dissent restated two of the traditional justifica-
tions and narrowly interpreted Mullane as had many state courts
over the years. The dissenting and majority opinions, as did many
of the state courts, balanced fundamentally different factors in de-
termining whether constructive notice was adequate. "Under all
the circumstances," the majority focused upon the relative effec-
tiveness of notice by publication as compared with actual mailed
notice. The Court, "on the basis of equivalence," concluded that
publication was nothing "more than a feint.""7 The dissent, how-
ever, balanced the state's interest in collecting its revenue against
the mortgagee's ability to protect itself and concluded this ability
absolved the state of any duty to give actual notice.78 The differ-
ence between the two approaches is that the former presumes that
actual notice is due while the latter asks the very question, is no-
tice due at all? If one accepts the premise that notice by publica-
tion is really not notice at all, a conclusion the Court itself has
expressed,7 9 then the logic of the dissent may be read to state that
a mortgagee is not entitled to notice because he is under a duty to
protect himself. That reasoning is no longer compelling because it
glosses over the Walker and Schroeder decisions which dispensed
with that duty where the "names and addresses are known or very
easily ascertainable."80
From a practical standpoint, the most troubling consequence
of the Mennonite ruling is the administrative impracticalities it cre-
ates for tax sale procedures.8 " The ultimate decision reached by
77. Id. at 2710 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
78. Mortgagees have various means of protecting their investment. Most banks use
escrow accounts in which part of each monthly payment is used to pay property taxes.
Other lendors require the borrower to provide copies of paid receipts. Still others will
check the records themselves.
79. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. See also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315; Covey
v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146 (1956).
80. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. at 212-13. See also supra note 50.
81. To determine whether there is a mortgage interest, the foreclosing municipality
will have to order a title search from an outside title abstract company. In Buffalo, New
York, such a search will cost approximately $75-100 per parcel. Erie County forecloses
approximately 3,000 parcels per year. As a consequence, the county will incur at least
$225,000 to $300,000 in additional expenses each year in conducting its sales. In addition,
more mailing, supplies, and manpower expenses will be incurred. Furthermore, in 1982
and 1983 the county netted only about $250,000 and $131,000 respectively from the ac-
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the Mennonite Court was that mortgagees are "very easily ascer-
tainable." It remains to be seen whether there is a point at which
that ascertainment becomes too expensive and impractical to un-
dertake. There is no question, however, that real estate tax delin-
quency is a serious and growing problem in American cities.8
2
The added costs and procedures required by Mennonite may
render tax foreclosures unprofitable if not entirely unmanageable.
Should foreclosures become too burdensome to conduct, it is con-
ceivable that some larger cities would be overwhelmed with delin-
quent parcels which would in turn worsen revenue collection
problems.83 In light of these adverse implications, state courts may
tual sales of delinquent parcels. See Ciotta, supra note 70. Viewed in this light, the added
expenses imposed by Mennonite would far outstrip the revenues raised from the sale. The
actual sale arguably will become a losing venture. Hence, municipalities may seek to cir-
cumvent these costs with statutes such as section 1126 of the Real Property Tax Law. On
the other hand, the additional expenses could simply be added on to the minimum sale
price of the parcel. See infra note 125.
82. In 1974, New York City lost $191.3 million in revenue due to uncollected prop-
erty taxes; Chicago lost $67.3 million; Boston lost $29.4 million. R. LAKE, REAL ESTATE
TAX DELINQUENCY 3 (1979), citing MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICES, INC., MOODY'S MUNICIPAL
AND GOVERNMENT MANUAL (1975).
A number of commentators have argued that the delinquency problem is best solved by
minimizing the cost of reselling the property to solvent private investors. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 25, at 277 (1973).
Others have argued that the best means of breaking the delinquency cycle is to en-
courage public ownership rather than private "speculation." See R. LAKE, supra at 205. It
remains clear, however, that collecting the property tax is a costly and difficult process. See
J. MARTIN, URBAN FINANCIAL STRESS, WHY CITIES Go BROKE 27 (1982).
83. For example, prior to 1981 the County of Cuyahoga, Ohio (which contains Cleve-
land), foreclosed tax liens by an action in personam by notifying all interested parties.
Under this cumbersome procedure the county officer was unable to keep up with the delin-
quencies. A simple foreclosure often took several years to complete and cost more to con-
duct than it ultimately yielded. Purchasers had no incentive to participate in such a com-
plex process. In the meantime, many properties further deteriorated. By 1976 there were
10,000 delinquent parcels in Cuyahoga County; by 1980 there were 24,000 delinquent
parcels. The Cleveland City Planning Commission published a study of the foreclosure sys-
tem which concluded:
Existing tax foreclosure procedures have proved inadequate to deal with the
scope of Cleveland's delinquency problem. The current foreclosure process is
both time consuming and costly, and the vast increase in the number of delin-
quent parcels has rendered it virtually inoperative. . . . The foreclosure proce-
dure results neither in recovery of delinquent tax revenues nor in productive
return of delinquent properties to the tax duplicate. Changes in the process are
necessary to reflect economic and financial realities and to insure that the pub-
lic receives compensation for lost tax revenues.
Harris v. Gaul, 572 F. Supp. 1554, 1556-57 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (quoting S. OLSON & M.
LACHMAN, TAX DELINQUENCY IN THE INNER CITY 129, 151 (1976)).
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turn a sympathetic ear to arguments which distinguish Mennonite
and the statutes reviewed therein. A narrow construction would
either distinguish the Indiana statutes or limit the holding's appli-
cation to mortgage interests. The following section addresses
these issues.
III. APPLYING Mennonite TO THE NEW YORK IN REM STATUTE
A. The Foreclosure Procedure
Title 3 of Article 11 of the New York Real Property Tax Law
(RPTL) governs the foreclosure of tax liens by an action in rem.85
The study recommended the adoption of a summary in rem foreclosure procedure
which would dispense with title searches. The Ohio legislature responded and adopted an
in rem act. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5721.18(B) (Page 1980).
In 1983, however, under constraint of Mennonite, the United States District Court of
Northern Ohio held that the act did not comply with due process because it failed to give
mailed notice to a land contract vendee. See Harris, 572 F.2d at 1554.
84. Two cases to date have distinguished Mennonite. In Washington v. Aquavella, 100
Wash. 2d 651, 674 P.2d 160 (1983), the Supreme Court of Washington held that Mennonite
did not require mailed notice to all individual water users of the Yakima River where that
river was being diverted for irrigation purposes. Although the court acknowledged that the
40,000 water users had protected property rights, it held that under "Mullane '[a] con-
struction of the due process clause which would place impossible or impracticable obstacles
in the way could not be justified.'" Id. at 657, 674 P.2d at 163 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S.
at 313-14). Had the Harris case been before the Washington state court, it is conceivable
that the court would have held that to notify the interested parties of 24,000 delinquent
parcels was so impracticable as to distinguish Mennonite.
In Grant County v. Guyer, 296 Or. 14, 672 P.2d 702 (1983) the Supreme Court of
Oregon held that under Mennonite notice by publication of a tax sale was acceptable be-
cause it was supplemented by other actions which would be reasonably expected to convey
a notice. In Grant, the owner was sent yearly delinquency notices which stated that a fore-
closure proceeding could be commenced at any time after a date fixed in the notice. Al-
though the notice did not state that a foreclosure would occur, the court held that notice by
publication of the actual sale was sufficient notice to the owner under the Mullane standard
because "it [was] 'supplemental to [the delinquency notice] which in itself may be reasona-
bly expected to convey a warning.'" Grant, 672 P.2d at 707 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at
316).
The Grant court did not address the Mennonite dicta whicb stated that even "a mortga-
gee's knowledge of delinquency. . . is not equivalent to notice that a tax sale is pending."
Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. at 2712. In any event, it is clear that Oregon's notice provisions are
inadequate as to mortgagees since those parties receive notice only by publication.
85. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 1120-1138 (McKinney 1972). The New York legisla-
ture has provided a complex but comprehensive treatment of this subject which may be
found in articles 10, 11, and 14 of the Real Property Tax Law. Article 10 contains the
County Tax Lien Sale procedure which is most similar to the procedure used in Indiana.
Id. §§ 1040-1054. Article 11 contains two alternative procedures: foreclosure of tax lien as
in action to foreclose a mortgage, id. §§ 1110-1116, and foreclosure of tax lien by action in
rem, id. §§ 1120-1138. The foreclosure of tax lien as in action to foreclose a mortgage is
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When a tax district holds a tax lien which, has been unpaid four
years"6 from the date the tax became a lien, that lien may be sum-
marily foreclosed by the taxing district.87 Within six months after
the date of a resolution to hold an in rem foreclosure, 88 and annu-
ally thereafter, the officer in charge of the foreclosure must file a
list of all properties subject to unpaid tax liens in the county
clerk's office.89 This "List of Delinquent Taxes" is the first step of
the in rem process. The list contains a description of each affected
parcel. 90
Thereafter, the enforcing officer publishes a notice of fore-
closure once a week for six successive weeks in two newspapers in
the district in which the parcel is located. The notice is also posted
in the office of the enforcing officer, the county courthouse and in
three other conspicuous public places.9 1 A copy of the notice is
an in personam method and seldomly used because of its prohibitive costs. Finally, article
14 contains special provisions relating to villages which constitute the most suspect proce-
dure because under that procedure even the owner is given notice only by publication. Id.
§§ 1400-1412.
Taxes are a lien against the real property. A tax lien may be sold to private parties at
auction by the procedure of articles 10 and 14. The lien purchaser would then foreclose
the lien as in an action to foreclose a mortgage. On the other hand, he may let the redemp-
tion period lapse and apply for a tax deed from the municipality which sold the lien. In the
event that there is no acceptable bid for any parcel of real property at the tax lien sale, the
tax district becomes the owner of the tax lien by operation of law. Id. § 1160. That lien is
then held as if it had been purchased at the sale and may be foreclosed as in an action to
foreclose a mortgage, supra, or in the alternative, in an action in rem.
The scope of this discussion is limited to the most widely used method-the in rem
method. This procedure is also the only procedure which provides for conditional notice to
mortgagees. Consequently, it contains the provision on which the Supreme Court reserved
opinion. The other procedures have no similar provision. Those procedures must also be
amended to conform with Mennonite.
86. A tax district may elect to reduce this period to two years. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 1120(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983).
87. Id.
88. Article 11 authorizes a tax district to elect either or both of two methods. Id. §
1104. The first is the foreclosure as in action to foreclose a mortgage. See supra note 85.
The other is the action in rem.
89. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1122 (McKinney Supp. 1983).
90. Id. § 1122(3). This description must include the lot, block, and section number.
Also, the name of the last owner as appears on the assessment roll, a statement of the
amount owed, and the interest penalties and charges which have been charged against the
delinquent parcel must be included. Id.
91. Id. § 1124. This notice is directed to all persons having an interest in the real
property described in the list. Any interested party may redeem the parcel by paying the
unpaid liens and interest penalties thereon before expiration of the redemption period
which is the scheduled date of sale. Id.
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then mailed to the owner as his name and address appears in the
latest tax assessment roll. The notice states that unless the prop-
erty is redeemed before the date of sale, title will pass to the tax-
ing district which then has title to sell the parcel at an in rem sale.
A mortgagee, lienor, or any other person having a claim or
interest in the property subject to foreclosure will also receive
mailed notice if he files a notice with the enforcing officer stating
his name, address and a description of the real property in which
he is interested. This notice is effective for five years unless can-
celled earlier.2 Should such notice be filed, the enforcing officer
will mail the same notice that is mailed to the owner. However,
the officer's failure to mail the notice does not affect the validity of
the foreclosure.9 3 Upon sale day, the highest bidder takes com-
plete ownership in fee simple, free and clear of all other claims,
liens and encumbrances against the property."4
The two relevant notice provisions are sections 1124 and
1126. Section 1124 contains the procedures for publication and
posting.9 5 Subdivision two of that section requires the officer to
mail a copy of the notice to the owner. 6 Section 1126 contains
the provision for mailed notice to mortgagees and the like on the
condition those parties register their interest. Other than as just
described, a mortgagee will not receive actual notice of an in rem
foreclosure.9 7 Actual notice to a mortgagee is therefore "condi-
92. Id. § 1126.
93. Id. § 1126(2).
94. Id. § 1136(5). See City of New Rochelle v. Stevens, 271 A.D. 977, 68 N.Y.S.2d 31,
affid, 297 N.Y. 533, 74 N.E.2d 469 (1947).
95. The relevant part of section 1124 states:
1. Upon the filing of such list in the office of the county clerk, the enforcing
officer forthwith shall cause a notice offoreclosure to be published at least once a week
for six successive weeks . . . published in the tax district ....
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1124(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983) (emphasis supplied).
96. The relevant part of section 1124 states:
2. The enforcing officer shall. . . cause a copy of such notice to be posted once
in the office of the enforcing officer, in the county courthouse ...and in three other
conspicuous places within such tax district and shall cause a copy of such notice to be
mailed to the last known address of each owner. . . as the name appears upon the
records in the office of the enforcing officer .
Id. § 1124(2) (emphasis supplied).
97. The relevant part of section 1126 states:
1. Any owner. . . mortgagee. . . or any person having a lien or claim. . . or
interest therein, may file with the enforcing officer a notice stating his name,
residence and address and a description of the real property in which such per-
son has an interest . . ..
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tioned" upon whether the mortgagee has registered under section
1126.
B. "Conditional" Notice Does Not Meet the Due Process Standard
Established in Mennonite
The Mennonite Court reserved opinion on the constitutional-
ity of provisions like section 1126. New York courts, however,
should not interpret the Court's silence as an approval of such
provisions. Indeed, in view of the cloud Mennonite places on in
rem titles, the New York courts should quickly declare section
1126 unconstitutional so that taxing districts may once again con-
duct their sales and convey unquestionably valid titles.
The courts will face convincing arguments in support of sec-
tion 1126. This section provides the most reliable and updated
source of names because it is revised periodically (filing is effective
only for five years) while real property records and tax assessment
rolls are often obsolete; similarly, registration under section 1126
provides a current address.98 Furthermore, it may also be argued
that section 1126 may reveal interests which are not usually re-
corded in property records such as tenants, neighbors or family
members. Finally, it might be argued that section 1126 is the most
reasonable balance of the competing interests because it provides
for actual mailed notice and allows the state to forego the cumber-
some and expensive process of running title searches on all the
affected parcels. Under this reasoning, it would be argued, section
1126 would meet the Mullane-Mennonite due process standard.
A closer examination, however, shows that although section
1126 is a possible compromise of the interests involved, it may fail
to satisfy the due process standard enunciated in Mennonite. The
Mennonite Court stated that personal "service is required even
2 .... [T]he enforcing officer shall mail to each such person a copy of the
notices required under this title . . . . The failure of the enforcing officer to
mail such notice as herein provided shall not affect the validity of any proceed-
ing brought pursuant to this title.
Id. § 1126.
98. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. For example, if a taxpayer owns prop-
erty which he rents, he or she will likely have the tax bills for that property sent to his own
residence. If the taxpayer moves, however, the tax bill for the rental property will continue
to be sent to his old residence because the rental property remains unaffected on the assess-
ment rolls. The unwary may forget to update the assessment roll by notifying the
municipality.
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though . . . creditors . . . have means . . . to discover whether
• . . tax sale proceedings are . . . to be initiated." ' More explic-
itly, the Court stated that "a party's ability to take steps to safe-
guard its interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional
obligation" to give notice. 100 The Mennonite standard goes beyond
the flexible Mullane test and does not seem to allow for any com-
promise. The conclusion to be drawn from the above statements is
that no matter how reasonable section 1126 may be, the state may
not absolve itself of its independent obligation to give mailed notice.
This obligation is not subject to compromise where the names and
addresses are readily available from the public records.
In addition, the above arguments in favor of section 1126 are
superficial. The mentioned advantages of that section are of no
value if a mortgagee fails to register. Few attorneys, much less un-
sophisticated mortgagees, are even aware of the existence of sec-
tion 1126. Thus, section 1126 filings are rare. The safeguard it
offers is therefore ineffective.
The New York legislature might consider making section
1126 filings mandatory in conjunction with mortgage filings. This,
however, would result in a great deal of additional paperwork and
would simply duplicate the mortgage filing itself. In any event,
these are legislative concerns. In the meantime, the courts must
address section 1126 as it exists today.
Prior to Menno'nite, several New York courts upheld section
1126 and similar local provisions against constitutional chal-
lenges.101 All of these decisions, however, relied upon precedents
which placed a duty upon the party to remain informed as to his
property interest. Since Mennonite, one New York court has held a
provision similar to section 1126 unconstitutional. Recently, the
New York Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that a no-
99. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
100. Id.
101. See City of Schenectady v. Kearney, 58 A.D.2d 711, 396 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1977);
City of New Rochelle v. Stevens, 110 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1951), aft'd, 279 A.D. 933, 111
N.Y.S.2d 772, appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 757, 108 N.E.2d 617, motion for leave to appeal
denied, 281 A.D. 699, 117 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1952) (a mortgagee may so order his affairs that
he may be informed of a tax sale by registering under former section 165-c of the tax law
which would require the officer to mail notice to mortgagees). See also Tobias v. College
Towne Homes, I10 Misc. 2d 287, 442 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1981); W.S. Realty Corp. v. City of
New York, 106 Misc. 2d 271, 431 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1980) (mortgagees or assignees who fail
to register under the appropriate section of New York City Administrative Code, identical
to section 1126, held to have waived their right to mailed 'notice).
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tice provision of the Erie County Tax Act, which is very similar to
section 1126, failed to meet the due process standard enunciated
in Mennonite. In In Re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of
Erie,10 2 the Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company (M&T)
brought an action to vacate an in rem foreclosure against a parcel
on which it held a fifty-five thousand dollar mortgage. M&T ar-
gued that the conditional notice provision was invalid under Men-
nonite. The County, on the other hand, maintained that Mennonite
did not upset the validity of conditional notice provisions, and that
under all the circumstances, the conditional notice provided the
bank with a reasonable opportunity to receive notice. The court
disagreed. Although the court acknowledged that Mennonite did
not address this type of provision, it nevertheless held that the
language in that decision clearly placed the burden upon the state
to give notice, rather than upon the individual mortgagee to re-
quest it. The state's constitutional obligation to provide notice
"could not be abrogated by requiring the mortgagee to request
notice." 03
In a separate opinion, however, Judge James Boomer con-
cluded that the practical difficulties of providing notice to so many
parties might weigh in favor of the state. Balancing the relative
interests, Judge Boomer believed that the legislature could reason-
ably find that a conditional notice provision was the most reasona-
102. 103 A.D.2d 636, 481 N.Y.S.2d 547 (Fourth Dep't 1984). The notice provision in
issue was section 11-14.0 of the Erie County Tax Act. That section states:
At any time after the enactment of this act, any owner of real property in the
county, any mortgagee thereof or any person having a lien or claim thereon or
interest therein may file with the commissioner of finance a notice stating his
name, residence, and post office address and a description of the parcel or par-
cels in which such person has an interest, which notice shall continue in effect
for the purposes of this section for a period of two years, unless earlier can-
celled by such person. The county attorney shall mail to each such person
forthwith after the completion and filing of the list of delinquent taxes and
posting as herein provided, a copy of the notice required under . . . this act
and affecting such parcel or parcels; and shall also mail to each such person a
copy of the notice of the sale of the real property affected by such list. Such
notices shall be mailed to the last known address of such persons by registered
or certified mail within sixty days. The failure of the county attorney to mail
such notices as herein provided shall not affect the validity of any proceeding
brought pursuant to the in rem provisions of this act.
ERIE CouNTY TAX Ac art. XI, § 11-14.0 (1956). For a survey of this act see Note, In Rem
Tax Foreclosure in Erie County--Invoidable Title?, 2 BUFFALO L. REV. 133 (1953). For the simi-
lar portion of § 1126 see supra note 97.
103. 103 A.D.2d 636, 640, 481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (1984).
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ble means of notice. He concluded that even under Mennonite, "it
is not unreasonable to expect such a mortgagee to file a state-
ment .. ."104
This Comment submits that the Appellate Division correctly
interpreted Mennonite. That decision clearly dismissed the argu-
ment that mortgagees are under a duty to protect their interests
from the state. Rather, it is the state that has the unconditional
obligation to give mailed notice to any affected interest which is
publicly recorded. Otherwise, the New York in rem provisions will
continue to allow significant interests to be forfeited without ac-
tual notice. Such forfeitures, without actual notice, violate due
process.
C. The Mennonite Rationale Should Be Extended to All Publicly
Recorded Property Interests
The Mennonite Court emphasized that any interested party
with a reasonably ascertainable name and address is entitled to no-
tice by mail. However, the Court also said that the state need not
undertake "extraordinary efforts" to ascertain the name and
whereabouts of a party not in the public record. 105 New York
should follow the Court's lead and search the public records for
all interested parties. It does not, however, appear that the state is
required to visit each parcel in order to determine whether there
might be an adverse owner, tenant or other unrecorded interest.
Where thousands of parcels are involved, such a requirement
would be "extraordinary."
When determining whether procedural protection is due an
interest, the Supreme Court considers "whether the nature of the
interest is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty or prop-
erty' language of the Fourteenth Amendment." 106 Property inter-
ests which enjoy due process protections extend well beyond ac-
tual ownership of the property in question10 7 and include
intangible rights such as the right to receive welfare benefits 08
104. Id. at 642, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
105. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. at 2711 n.4.
106. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972)).
107. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
108. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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and the right to continued employment as a federal employee.10 D
The Supreme Court has stated that property rights are "created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understand-
ings that stem from an independent source such as state law. ' 110
The Court frequently looks to state law to determine whether an
interest is a "property interest."
New York's RPTL expressly recognizes liens, judgments and
other encumbrances as property rights worthy of protection by
affording these interests the right to register under section
1126.1' Therefore, it is submitted that these interests are entitled
to actual notice of an in rem foreclosure since New York law rec-
ognizes them as property interests. 2
The law of several other jurisdictions indicates that actual no-
tice must be afforded these interests in order to satisfy due pro-
cess. In Laz v. Southwestern Land Co.,11 3 the Arizona Supreme
Court long ago held that mortgagees were entitled to mailed no-
tice of a tax sale. More recently, the Court of Appeals in that state
held that an assessment lienholder was also entitled to mailed no-
tice. In Brandt v. City of Yuma,"" the plaintiff tax sale purchaser
sought to quiet title against the city of Yuma, which held assess-
ment liens against the subject delinquent parcel. Under the assess-
ment statutes, the delinquent property had been "struck off" to
the city.11 5 Simultaneously, the county sold the property for tax
delinquency without notifying the city. The court expressed some
question as to whether the city was an owner or lienholder but
stated that "[i]n any event, the City had a substantial interest in
109. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Cf. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
110. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
111. Those persons entitled to register are any owner or mortgagee of real property,
or "any person having a lien or claim thereon or interest therein." N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 1126(1) (McKinney 1972). The same persons are entitled to redeem delinquent
property. Id. § 1122(6). See also infra note 112.
112. Analogously, in a private action to foreclose a mortgage, the following parties
must be served with process as named defendants: every person having an estate or interest
in possession as tenant in fee, for life, by curtesy or for years; every person entitled to a
reversion, remainder, or inheritance of the real property; every person having a right of
dower; every person having a lien or encumbrance, and, where the mortgage is upon a
public utility, the Public Service Commission. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1311 (McKinney
1979).
113. 97 Ariz. 69, 397 P.2d 52 (1964).
114. 124 Ariz. 29, 601 P.2d 1065 (Ct. App. 1979).
115. Id. at 31, 601 P.2d at 1067.
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the land, which was a matter of public record" ' which entitled it
to mailed notice of the sale.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has held that a land contract
purchaser was entitled to notice of a tax foreclosure if that con-
tractual interest was publicly recorded. In Dow v. State of Michi-
gan,11 7 a land contract purchaser brought an action to quiet title
against the state which had acquired title through a tax sale. The
Dow court held that both the titleholder and the contract purchas-
ers had significant property interests which fell within the protec-
tion of the due process clause. 8
In Continental Insurance Co. v. Moseley,' 9 the Supreme Court
of Nevada held that the creditor of an estate was not denied due
process by use of a summary proceeding for administration of the
estate wherein only published notice of the proceeding was given.
Prior to the decedent's death, the appellant had filed a civil action
which was pending at the time of publication. The court held that
Nevada's policy of providing an inexpensive means of administer-
ing small estates justified the lack of actual notice to a creditor.
The United States Supreme Court recently vacated and remanded
that decision and without comment cited Mennonite.'2" Although
not a tax sale case, the Supreme Court's reversal implies that cred-
itors are entitled to notice of tax sales if their claims are recorded
in the public judgment dockets.
In contrast to these recorded types of interests, the New York
Court of Appeals recently considered whether an adverse owner
of land was entitled to mailed notice of a tax sale. In Congregation
Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. County of Sullivan,"'x the court held that
because the "[p]laintiffs name did not appear as owner on either
the real proprty records or the tax rolls . . . the assessor was ex-
cused from giving personal notice of the tax sale.112 2 The name
116. Id.
117. 396 Mich. 192, 240 N.W.2d 450 (1976).
118. Id. See also Harris v. Gaul, 572 F. Supp. 1554 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (land contract
vendee has substantial interest under Ohio law); Lohr v. Cobur Corp., 654 S.W.2d 883
(Mo. 1983) (en banc) (interest held by virtue of deed of trust is a substantial property right
entitled to notice of tax sale); Bankers Union Life Ins. Co. v. Hanks & Mistwood, 654
S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1983) (companion case to Lohr, deed of trust beneficiary entitled to
notice).
119. 653 P.2d 158 (Nev. 1982).
120. 103 S. Ct. 3530 (1983).
121. 59 N.Y.2d 418, 452 N.E.2d 1207, 465 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1983).
122. Id. at 425, 452 N.E.2d at 1212, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
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and address of an adverse owner are not reasonably ascertainable
because that interest is not recorded anywhere. Therefore, ac-
cording to the court, under Mennonite constructive notice sufficed.
Unless the Supreme Court would require the assessor to go
greater lengths than checking the public records, D'Satmar ap-
pears to be a fair decision. The D'Satmar court found support for
its ruling in Mennonite's statement that extraordinary efforts need
not be taken to discover the identity of a mortgagee whose iden-
tity is not in the public record.1
23
The pattern which appears from these decisions is that it is
not necessarily the nature of the property interest affected that
determines what type of notice is due. Rather, it appears that
where the interest is publicly recorded and thereby reasonably as-
certainable, actual notice is due. The New York Office of the
State Comptroller recently issued two opinions which indicate that
notice of tax sales or in rem foreclosures should be given to any
publicly recorded interest.12 4 It should also be mentioned that the
additional costs for searches on tax delinquent parcels for the pur-
pose of mailing notices will likely be added to the tax, interest and




Notice by mail or other certain means is a minimal constitu-
tional precondition to any tax foreclosure proceeding where an
interested party's name and address are publicly recorded. The
Mennonite decision dismissed the arguments previously used to dis-
tinguish tax sales from the due process requirements of Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
Notwithstanding the Mennonite Court's extension of Mullane,
there remains a question as to whether conditional notice provi-
123. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct at 2711 n.4.
124. Op. State Compt. No. 83-175 (1983). Without explanation the opinion states: "It
also goes without saying that the conclusion reached [notice due to mortgagees] applies not
only to mortgagees but any other persons with a publicly recorded interest in the tax delin-
quent property which would be nullifed and extinguished by the execution of a tax deed."
Id. at 4.
125. See Op. State Compt. No. 83-214 (1983). Such treatment would be consistent
with section 1122 of the Real Property Tax Law which adds the cost of all interest and
penalties to the redemption amount.
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sions will meet the due process standard in Mennonite. The Court's
rejection of the duty argument indicates that such provisions will
fail to meet the new due process standard. New York courts,
therefore, should not distinguish the New York in rem provision
merely because it was not addressed in Mennonite. The in rem stat-
ute continues to cause significant property interests to be forfeited
without actual notice. This process is inequitable and unnecessa-
rily harsh. In addition, to uphold the in rem provision would leave
the cloud Mennonite created hovering over tax titles until the Su-
preme Court finally addressed the issue itself. By declaring the in
rem statute unconstitutional, New York courts will remove this
cloud and thereby encourage tax sale participation.
The broad language of the Mennonite decision also indicates
that other interested parties such as lienholders, judgment credi-
tors, land contract vendees and holders of other publicly recorded
interests will benefit as well as mortgagees.
The full scope and parameters of the Mennonite ruling can
only be the subject of speculation. A more immediate concern is
to address the questions the case raised concerning conditional
notice statutes like section 1126 of the RPTL. Section 1126 is a
minimal attempt to provide actual notice. It provides a compro-
mise so that the state may forego the costs of title searches and
actual mailing. Yet it is a solution which results in an inequitable
forfeiture. To call such a result a "compromise" is illusory at best.
New York should go beyond the conditional notice of section
1126 and make certain that no forfeiture occurs unless all inter-
ested parties are made aware of their right to appear and prevent
their loss.
RICHARD M. SCHAUS
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